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FOOTNOTES
1 See 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 25.03 (1993).
2 See generally 8 Harl, Agricultural Law § 61.03 (1993).
3 See I.R.C. § 464.
4 Id.
5 I.R.C. § 464(c)(1).  See Est. of Wallace v. Comm’r, 95
T.C. 525 (1990), aff'd, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,387 (11th Cir. 1992) (medical doctor who owned
cattle feeding business was limited entrepreneur who did
not actively participate in cattle feeding business and
profit motive was irrelevant; only feed actually
consumed during year was deductible).
6 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.464-2(a)(1).
7 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.464-2(a)(3).
8 I.R.C. § 464(d).
9 I.R.C. § 464(c)(2).  The term "family" has the same
meaning as in I.R.C. § 267(c)(4).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. In the 1950’s a fence was constructed between
the parties’ pastures but from 11 to 30 feet onto the
defendant’s property. The defendant had the property
resurveyed and discovered the error and moved the fence to
the correct boundary line. The plaintiff claimed title to the
portion of the defendant’s property on the plaintiff’s side of
the fence and sought damages for the defendant’s removal
of a partition fence under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.350. The
court reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment for
the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff failed to present
evidence that the plaintiff openly, notoriously, exclusively
and continuously used the disputed land for at least ten
years. The court held that the mere existence of a fence for
almost 40 years was insufficient to establish title by adverse
possession. Dorris v. Morgan, 852 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993).
POSSESSION. A fence constructed between the
parties’ properties was built 11.5 feet onto the defendant’s
property. The plaintiff crop farmed the disputed strip from
1943 through 1987, when the defendant began clearing the
crops from the strip each year. The court held that the
plaintiff’s crop farming of the land for more than 20 years
satisfied the requirements of open, notorious and actual
possession sufficient to transfer title to the plaintiff by
adverse possession. Cobb v. Nagele, 611 N.E.2d 599 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1993).
This case involved two incidents of adverse possession.
In the first incident, the defendant had raised hay for over
ten years on a field which included land belonging to the
plaintiff. The court held that the annual raising of crops on
the disputed land was sufficient adverse possession to
transfer title to the defendant. In the second incident, the
defendant had erected a fence several feet onto the
plaintiff’s land and grown crops on the defendant’s side of
the fence. The plaintiff had helped maintain the fence. The
court held that the defendant’s use of the disputed property
was sufficient adverse possession to transfer title to the
defendant. Forester v. Whitelock, 850 S.W.2d 427 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1993).
ANIMALS
HORSES-ALM § 1.01[1].* The defendant owned a
thoroughbred horse which escaped from a fenced pasture
during a storm. The plaintiff’s car struck the horse on a
highway and the plaintiff sued in strict liability the owner of
the horse and the ranch on which the horse was pastured.
The court held that an owner of an escaped domestic animal,
such as a horse, was not strictly liable for injuries caused by
the horse unless the animal was known by the owner to have
a propensity to escape. Because no evidence was presented
as to the propensity of defendant’s horse to escape, the
defendant could not be held strictly liable for the plaintiff’s
injuries. Briscoe v. Graybeal, 622 A.2d 805 (Md. Ct. App.
1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor was a produce
handler who purchased agricultural products from several
creditors. Each creditor had perfected its statutory
producer’s lien after the filing of the petition. The trustee
sought to avoid the creditors’ security interests. The
creditors argued that Section 546(b) prevented the
avoidance because the post-petition perfection of the
statutory lien related back to a prepetition date. The
statutory lien provided that if the lien was perfected within
60 days after delivery, the lien acquired priority over all
other liens against the produce. The court held that because
the statute did not expressly identify a date upon which the
lien became perfected, Section 546(b) did not apply to
prevent the avoidance of the liens. Matter of Peter J.
Schmitt Co., Inc., 154 B.R. 47 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS
AUTOMOBILE. The debtor had granted a security
interest to the debtor’s father in the debtor’s automobile
within one year of filing for Chapter 7 and had claimed the
exemption for the automobile. The trustee sought to avoid
the security interest and the debtor filed for dismissal of the
case to prevent the loss of the security interest. The court
held that because the debt secured by the automobile was
voluntary and the security interest was avoidable, the
exemption could not be allowed. The court also held that the
threat of the avoidance was insufficient cause for dismissal.
In re Baumgarten, 154 B.R. 66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
    CHAPTER 12
SETOFF-ALM § 13.03[8].* Prior to filing bankruptcy,
the debtor was indebted to the ASCS for the use of cash
collateral in a previous bankruptcy case and had enrolled
farm land in the conservation reserve program (CRP).  The
debtor had assumed the CRP contracts in bankruptcy as
executory contracts.  The ASCS sought to setoff the post-
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petition CRP payments against the pre-petition cash
collateral debt.  The District Court held that the CRP
contracts were executory with continuing obligations by
both parties which gave rise to payments only after
performance was complete; therefore, the CRP payment
obligations arose post-petition and could not be setoff
against the pre-petition cash collateral debt.  The appellate
court reversed, holding that the CRP contract’s continuing
obligations were in the form of mutual promises and not
conditions precedent; therefore, the rental payments arose
pre-petition and could be setoff against the debtor’s
prepetition amounts owed to the ASCS.   In re Gerth, 991
F.2d 1428 (8th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 136 B.R. 241 (D. S.D.
1991).
SETTLEMENT-ALM § 13.03[8].*  A Chapter 12
debtor reached an agreement in settlement of claims by a
creditor bank and had the agreement read into the court
record.  After the debtor learned that the bank official with
whom the debtor negotiated was sued by the bank for
wrongful acts, the debtor moved for withdrawal of approval
of the agreement and dismissal of the case.  The Bankruptcy
and District Courts held that, although the wrongful acts of
the bank official may have made the agreement unfair to the
debtor, the substantial costs to the estate and other creditors
from rejecting the agreement required that the agreement be
enforced.  The courts also found that the debtor had not
shown actual or constructive fraud by the bank. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the debtor had a right
to immediate dismissal upon request, so long as no fraud by
the debtor was shown.  In re of Cotton, 992 F.2d 311 (11th
Cir. 1993), rev’g, 136 B.R. 888 (M.D. Ga. 1992), aff'g,
127 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1991).
    CHAPTER 13
PLAN. The debtor’s income included distributions from
a pension plan and social security payments. The debtor’s
nondebtor spouse also received social security payments.
The debtor also had monthly business expenses from a
business which had not yet produced any income. The
debtor claimed the pension funds and social security
payments as exempt, set an arbitrary amount for payment to
unsecured creditors, included in the plan double monthly
payments on a car loan and included in the monthly
expenses the nondebtor spouse’s living expenses.  Although
the court held that the pension and social security payments
were exempt under Ill. Rev. Stat. ¶ 5 1/2 -1006(a), the
payments must be included in the debtor’s disposable
income for purposes of Section 1325(b). Also, the
nondebtor spouse’s social security payments were required
to be included in the debtor’s disposable income calculation
because the debtor included the spouse’s living expenses in
the plan. The double monthly payments on the debtor’s car
loan were not allowed. In re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
Creditors objected to the Chapter 13 plan as not meeting
the Section 1325(a)(4) best interest of creditors test because
the debtors had a substantial amount of equity in their home
which was not applied toward the plan. The debtors argued
that under a Chapter 7 liquidation, the proceeds from the
sale of the residence would be reduced by capital gains
taxes; therefore, the capital gains taxes should not be
included in the best interest of creditors test calculations.
The court held that the capital gains taxes were includible in
the calculation because the capital gain taxes would be
payable as a priority administrative expense of a Chapter 7
estate. Matter of Young, 153 B.R. 886 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
 AUTOMATIC STAY. Prior to filing for bankruptcy the
debtor was assessed for income taxes, interest and penalties
for wilfull failure to pay the taxes. The debtor made most of
the payments on the taxes owed and the IRS allocated the
payments to the taxes and interest, leaving some of the
penalty portion unpaid. The debtor filed for bankruptcy and
received a discharge of the penalties but not the taxes or
interest. The IRS then reallocated the pre-petition payments
primarily to the penalty portion and notified the debtor of
the new deficiency on the tax. The court held that the post-
discharge reallocation violated the discharge automatic stay.
Langlois v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,364
(N.D. N.Y. 1993).
COOPERATIVES
SECURITIES VIOLATIONS-ALM § 14.04.*  The
plaintiff was a member cooperative of the defendant
cooperative and had liquidated. The plaintiff sought to
recover its capital credits with the defendant and brought
suit under the federal securities law for securities fraud. The
defendant argued that it was exempt from the securities laws
and that the capital credits were not securities. The court
held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action sufficient
to deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss the action because
(1) the defendant had admitted that the credits were
securities by registering the credits with the SEC, and
although cooperative securities are exempt from the filing
requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), the credits were not
exempt from the anti-fraud provisions. Consumers Gas &
Oil v. Farmland Indus., 815 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Colo.
1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final the
change of the classification of Mississippi and Missouri to
brucellosis-free states. 58 Fed. Reg. 34700 (June 29, 1993).
The APHIS has adopted as final the change in
classification of Oregon from a Class A to Class Free state.
58 Fed. Reg. 36593 (July 8, 1993).
CONTAGIOUS DISEASES ACT-ALM § 9.02[1].*
The plaintiff had qualified as a "specifically approved
stockyard" under the Contagious Diseases Act, but the
status was withdrawn after USDA inspectors found
violation of sanitation and identification requirements
pertaining to cattle. After notice and an informal hearing,
the status was withdrawn for five years. The plaintiff
appealed the suspension, arguing that the informal hearing
process violated USDA regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 1.131 et
seq., requiring application of uniform rules of practice.  The
court held that the uniform practice regulations did not
require application of the rules where the USDA had issued
regulations for an informal hearing in such cases. The
plaintiff also argued that the informal hearing violated the
Administrative Procedures Act, but the court disagreed,
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holding that the APA did not apply unless the statute
involved required a formal hearing. The court reviewed the
USDA decision using a rational basis standard and held that
the findings of violations were supported by the evidence
but that the six year suspension was too severe given the
plaintiff's improved sanitation and record of
misidentification of cattle after the inspections. The
suspension was decreased to six months. Moore v.
Madigan, 990 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 789 F.
Supp. 1479 (W.D. Mo. 1992).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04[1].* The FCIC has
issued interim regulations amending the regulations
implementing the Disaster Assistance Act of 1988 to make
the regulations applicable to disaster relief statutes passed
after 1988. 58 Fed. Reg. 36592 (July 8, 1993).
The plaintiff were rice farmers whose rice crop was
damaged by early heavy rains. In July the plaintiff notified
the FCIC agent who inspected the crop and who filed a
report in August listing the crop loss date as May. The
plaintiff also applied to the ASCS for disaster payments.
The local and state committees denied the disaster payments
based on their finding that the plaintiff had not used
“necessary farming practices” to produce a crop. The FCIC
also denied insurance coverage because of “failure to follow
good farming practices,” but eventually based denial on
failure of the plaintiff to provide notice of the total crop loss
within 10 days after the crop loss. The court held that the
FCIC was not entitled to summary judgment because the
FCIC regulations require the FCIC to make the
determination of the total crop loss; therefore, the notice
period could begin only after the FCIC had made a
determination of the total crop loss. The court held that the
ASCS determination was not arbitrary or capricious because
it was supported by substantial, although controverted,
evidence that the plaintiff did not follow the necessary
farming practices for a good crop. Wilson v. U.S.D.A., 991
F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1993).
NATIONAL FORESTS. The plaintiff had contracted
with the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to partially
cut four tracts of timber on federal land. A forest fire
destroyed a portion of one tract and required the clearcutting
of that tract in order to preserve the soil, to avoid insect
infestation and to harvest the timber before it was destroyed
by insects and disease. However, the plaintiff did not have
the capacity to clear cut that tract while cutting on the other
tracts. The BLM decided that the damaged tract should be
removed from the contract and resold. The plaintiff
reluctantly agreed and the tract was sold at a price per board
foot greater than the plaintiff’s original contract price. The
plaintiff sought recovery of the difference in price, alleging
mutual mistake and government coercion in the plaintiff’s
decision to allow withdrawal of the damaged tract from the
contract. The court held that the forest fire made
performance by both parties impossible and allowed
rescision of the contract to the extent of the damaged tract.
Spalding & Son, Inc. v. U.S., 28 Fed. Cl. 242 (1993).
SUGAR. The CCC has issued interim regulations
governing the marketing allotments for sugar processed
from domestically produced sugarcane and sugar beets and
crystaline fructose manufactured from corn, for fiscal 1992
through 1996. 58 Fed. Reg. 36120 (July 6, 1993).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
amendments to the regulations to allow indemnity claims
for cattle and bison which are destroyed because of
tuberculosis after being added to a herd under quarantine. 58
Fed. Reg. 34697 (June 29, 1993).
The APHIS has issued interim regulations changing the
designation of Hawaii from a modified accredited state to an
accredited free state. 58 Fed. Reg. 34699 (June 29, 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CREDIT FOR PRIOR TRANSFERS-A L M §
5.04[5].* The decedent’s predeceased spouse’s estate
consisted almost entirely of joint tenancy property which
passed outside of probate to the decedent; therefore, the
predeceased spouse’s estate was not probated. The decedent
elected to pay the federal estate tax by installments,
incurring interest on the deferred payments. At the
decedent’s death the estate claimed a credit for prior
transfers under I.R.C. § 2013. The IRS reduced the credit
because the IRS subtracted the interest paid on the
installment payments of federal estate tax as an
administrative expense of the predeceased spouse’s estate.
The court held that the interest paid was not an
administrative expense because no estate was created since
the predeceased spouse’s property all passed through the
survivorship right. Therefore, the interest paid did not
diminish the amount of property passing to the decedent and
did not diminish the credit for prior transfers. Est. of
Whittle v. Comm’r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,141
(7th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 97 T.C. 362 (1991).
FAMILY TRUSTS-ALM § 8.08.* The taxpayer’s
transfer of personal assets and compensation to two family
trusts was disregarded for federal income tax purposes as a
sham where the taxpayer continued to have possession and
control over the property. Keefover v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-276.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* In 1965, the taxpayers established trusts for their
daughter and granddaughter. Before September 1985 and
after another granddaughter and a grandson were born to the
daughter, the taxpayers established identical trusts for these
grandchildren. The taxpayers and beneficiaries amended the
trusts to change the order of the successor cotrustees. The
IRS ruled that the amendments did not subject the trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9324007, Mar. 17, 1993.
The decedent’s will created two trusts, each with the
surviving spouse as income beneficiary with the
noncumulative right to withdraw 5 percent of the corpus
from both trusts. At the death of the surviving spouse, the 5
percent amount for the year of the spouse’s death was
included in the spouse’s estate. The trusts were each split
into two trusts with one trust receiving 5 percent of the trust
corpus and the other 95 percent. The IRS ruled that the
surviving spouse would be considered the transferor of the 5
percent trusts and that the split of the trusts would not
subject them to GSTT. In addition, the IRS ruled that no
gain or loss would be recognized on the split of the trusts.
Ltr. Rul. 9324014, Mar. 19, 1993.
The decedent’s 1953 will created a trust which had three
classes of beneficiaries, a one-half interest to the issue of a
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predeceased son, a one third interest to a daughter, and a
one-sixth interest to the issue of the daughter. The
beneficiaries divided the trust into three trusts which
continued all provisions of the original trust. The IRS ruled
that the partition of the trust would not subject the trusts to
GSTT or cause recognition of gain or loss to the trusts. Ltr.
Rul. 9324015, Mar. 19, 1993.
The decedent’s will created a family trust, a portion of
which was subject to GSTT because of post-1985 additions
to corpus by the decedent. The decedent’s executor
inadvertently allocated part of the decedent’s unused portion
of the GSTT exemption to direct bequests which were not
“direct skips” because the bequests were less than $2
million and were made before January 1, 1990. The IRS
ruled that the erroneously allocated exemption would be
allocated to the portion of the family trust subject to GSTT
under the executor’s election and not under the automatic
allocation rules in I.R.C. § 2632(c). Ltr. Rul. 9324029,
Mar. 23, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer created a revocable trust which was named as the
beneficiary of the taxpayer’s IRA. The taxpayer’s spouse
was the beneficiary of the trust and the trust provided that
the trustee was to distribute, at least annually, the greater of
all of the income of the IRA or the IRA account balance
payable over the life expectancy of the surviving spouse.
The IRS ruled that the trust would be eligible for the marital
deduction. The IRS also ruled that the passing of the IRA to
the trust would not result in acceleration of income in
respect of decedent under I.R.C. § 691(a)(2). Ltr. Rul.
9324024, Mar. 22, 1993.
The decedent’s revocable trust became irrevocable upon
the decedent’s death and provided that a portion of the trust
was to pass to a marital trust. The trust provided that the
trustee could apply to a court for amendment of the trust
provisions and granted the court the power to amend any
portion of the trust. The IRS ruled that the power granted to
a court was sufficient to withhold a portion of the trust
income or principal from the surviving spouse; therefore,
the trust was not eligible QTIP because the spouse could
receive less than the full trust interest granted by the
decedent. Ltr. Rul. 9325002, Feb. 26, 1993.
SALE OF STOCK TO ESOP.  The executrix
purchased stock with estate funds and sold the stock back to
the corporation's Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)
and applied for a refund for the 50 percent deduction
allowed at the time of the sale.  The IRS had issued Rev.
Rul. 87-13, 1987-1 C.B. 20 interpreting I.R.C. § 2057 as
requiring the decedent to own the stock prior to death.
Congress retroactively amended I.R.C. § 2057 to require
that the stock sold be owned by the decedent prior to death.
The court upheld the constitutionality of the retroactive
application of the amendment which denied the 50 percent
deduction to the estate because the estate could reasonably
foresee the amendment and the amendment was not a new
tax but a change of tax benefits. Ferman v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,140 (5th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 92-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,100 (E.D. La. 1992).
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[13][a].* The corporation
had three types of stock: (1) voting preferred stock which
had a right to annual dividends equal to a percentage of the
liquidation value; (2) voting common stock; and (3)
nonvoting common stock. Two brothers and their spouses
each owned one fourth of the preferred shares; a child of
each brother owned half of the voting common stock and
nonparticipatory family members owned the nonvoting
common stock. The children transferred some of their shares
of voting common stock to their children by gift. The
donees had the right to exchange the voting stock for
nonvoting stock.  The IRS ruled that the Section 2701
valuation rules applied to the stock transfers but that the
preferred shares owned by the donee’s uncle and aunt would
be valued at their fair market value because the aunt and
uncle were not “applicable family members.” The IRS also
ruled that because the preferred stock had a right of
accumulated dividends of at least 6 percent, the dividend
was a right to a qualified payment under Section 2701(c)(3).
The shareholder agreement required an amendment to the
agreement in order to transfer shares to persons other than
the existing shareholders; therefore, the IRS ruled that the
transfers and amendment of the shareholder agreement
would subject all of the stock to the valuation rules of I.R.C.
§ 2703.  Ltr. Rul. 9324018, Mar. 19, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The taxpayer owned a corporation and an interest
in a partnership. The corporation forgave a portion of a debt
owed to it by the partnership and increased the amount it
owed to the taxpayer personally. The taxpayer argued that
no income was realized because one debt was exchanged for
another. The court held that the partnership realized
discharge of indebtedness income separately from the
taxpayer. Lind v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-286.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03*
DEFINITION. The IRS has ruled that the New Jersey
Uniform Limited Partnership Law, N.J. Stat. §§ 42:2A-1 et
seq. corresponds to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for
purposes of federal tax law. Rev. Rul. 93-45, I.R.B. 1993-
24, 58.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a partnership under the state limited liability
company statute. The partnership agreement and state LLC
law provide that the bankruptcy or liquidation of a partner
would cause the dissolution of the partnership. The IRS
ruled that the partnership lacked the corporate characteristic
of continuity of life. The partnership agreement and state
LLC law provide that a partner may not transfer an interest
in the partnership without the consent of the other partners.
The IRS ruled that the partnership lacked the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests; therefore,
the partnership would be taxed as a partnership for federal
tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9325043, Mar. 29, 1993.
The taxpayers formed a limited liability company. The
LLC agreement and state LLC law provide that the
bankruptcy or liquidation of a partner would cause the
dissolution of the LLC. The IRS ruled that the LLC lacked
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. The LLC
agreement and state LLC law provide that the management
of the LLC is vested in all of the partners. The IRS ruled
that the LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of
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centralized management; therefore, the LLC would be taxed
as a partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9325048,
Mar. 30, 1993.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  The IRS had
sent a final S corporation administrative adjustment (FSAA)
concerning the corporation's taxable years prior to January
1987 when regulations were promulgated excepting small S
corporations from the unified procedures.  The shareholders
argued that the small partnership exception applied to small
S corporations before the regulations were promulgated.
The court held that I.R.C. § 6241 pre-empted application of
the small partnership exception by providing no exception
for S corporations unless and until regulations were
promulgated.  Beard v. U.S., 992 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir.
1993), aff’g, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,175 (N.D.
Ala. 1992).
MORTGAGES
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiff granted a
mortgage on the plaintiff’s farm land to the defendant’s
predecessor “subject to the Farm Credit Act of 1971.” The
defendant sought foreclosure by advertisement of the
mortgage and gave the plaintiff the 45 day notice for
restructuring required by the Act; however, the defendant
failed to suspend the foreclosure procedure during the 45
days.  The defendant commenced a second foreclosure later
but did not give the 45 day notice or otherwise provide the
plaintiff with an opportunity to restructure the loan. The
court held that although the plaintiff did not have a private
right to enforce the Act, the plaintiff could use the lack of
notice as a defense to a foreclosure action. The court held
that the first 45 day notice was not sufficient because the
defendant failed to suspend the foreclosure during the 45
days. Burgmeier v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 499
N.W.2d 43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
REDEMPTION. The plaintiffs borrowed funds from
the FmHA and granted a mortgage on their farm to secure
the loan. After the plaintiffs defaulted and the FmHA
provided loan servicing options, the FmHA sought
foreclosure. The plaintiffs argued that the FmHA was
required under Wis. Stat. § 864.10(2) to wait one year
before selling the farm. The court held that the extensive
loan restructuring rights and self-imposed delays provided
by the FmHA regulations provided sufficient time for the
plaintiffs to redeem their farm before foreclosure sale;
therefore, the FmHA was not required to allow the state
redemption period. Essentially, the court reasoned that the
federal borrower’s rights statutes and regulations preempted
the state borrower’s rights. United States v. Einum, 992
F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1993).
NEGLIGENCE
HERBICIDE SPRAYING-ALM § 1.02[3].* In 1983,
the plaintiff planted peach trees on land adjacent to the
defendant’s land. In 1988, the defendant planted cotton on
the land and had herbicide applied “over-the-top” on the
cotton plants. The plaintiff alleged that the herbicide ruined
the peach trees and caused a complete loss of production.
The plaintiff produced evidence of loss of production by
providing production records from other similar peach trees
on the plaintiff’s property. The court held that the evidence
was sufficient to allow the jury to award damages for the
loss of future production and profits. Crosby v. Spencer,
428 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
PARTNERSHIP
JOINT VENTURE-ALM § 7.03[1][a].* After a bank
had cancelled a farmer’s line of credit and seized the
proceeds of the farmer’s crops, the farmer was unable to pay
rent for equipment or rent for use of farm land. The
equipment lessor and the landlord agreed to help the farmer
continue farming for one more year and financed the
farmer’s operation for the next crop year. The parties agreed
that any profit would accrue solely to the farmer, but no
discussion of loss liability was discussed. The crops for the
next year were insufficient to pay both creditors and the
equipment lessor sought recovery from the landlord based
on shared liability through a joint venture. The court held
that because the parties did not agree to share the profits, no
joint venture was formed and no shared liability for losses
could be enforced. L & H Leasing Co. v. Dutton, 612
N.E.2d 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY-ALM § 7.03[1][d].*
The plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff’s son, operated a
construction business as a partnership. The plaintiff also
owned a ranch and operated the ranch with the partnership.
In order to obtain a low interest rate FmHA loan, the
plaintiff deeded the ranch to the defendant without receiving
any consideration in return. The ranch continued to be
operated under the partnership with no change in either
partner’s share of profits or expenses. The court held that
the ranch remained partnership property because the parties
did not intend to remove the ranch from the partnership.
Holmes v. Holmes, 849 P.2d 1140 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
HERBICIDE-ALM § 1.02[4].* The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of the herbicide Prowl for damages to the
plaintiff’s bean crop. The court held that the manufacturer
could not be held strictly liable for the damages because no
evidence was presented showing that the herbicide was
unreasonably dangerous. The court held that the plaintiff
had presented sufficient evidence of breach of warranty of
merchantability by presenting expert testimony that the
herbicide could cause the damage suffered by the beans.
The defendant claimed that its disclaimer of express and
implied warranty of merchantability relieved it of liability
except for the cost of the product. The disclaimer was
included in a 107 page manual on application of herbicides.
The court held that the disclaimer was conspicuous as a
matter of law but that further evidence was needed as to
whether the plaintiff had an opportunity to read the
disclaimer before purchase of the herbicide. The court also
ruled that the disclaimer’s limitation of remedy to exclude
consequential damages was unconscionable because the
disclaimer left the plaintiff without effective recourse for a
defective product and the plaintiff was not afforded an
opportunity to bargain for the limitation because the
herbicide was purchased through a third person. Adams v.
American Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1992).
PROPERTY
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DRAINAGE EASEMENT. The plaintiff owned
farmland through which the defendant owned a drainage
easement. The defendant told the company which dredged
the ditch that the defendant’s easement was 200 feet wide
and that the company could use as much land as necessary
to accomplish the dredging of the ditch. The dredging
company clear cut the vegetation around the ditch and
deposited the dredged silt on the plaintiff’s land. The
dredging resulted in severe erosion along the ditch, resulting
in a loss of 1.65 acres of the plaintiff’s farmland. The
defendant failed to produce any evidence of the width of the
easement originally granted and the court held that the
easement was restricted to the extent of the defendant’s
prior use of the ditch. The court also held that the defendant
must compensate the plaintiff for the loss of land resulting
from the dredging of the ditch. The court also required the
defendant to properly maintain a bridge over the ditch which
was built by the defendant to provide the plaintiff with
access to land separated by the ditch. Peters v. Milks
Grove Sp. Drainage Dist., 610 N.E.2d 1385 (Ill. Ct. App.
1993).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
LACHES . In 1920, the defendant’s predecessor in
interest filed a suit to establish its rights to store water from
a creek. The plaintiff’s predecessor in interest was not made
a party to that suit and had a prior right to draw water from
the creek. In 1925, the defendant’s predecessor in interest
entered into a stipulation with the named parties to allow it
to store water from the creek during October through May
each year. The defendant sought summary judgment in the
plaintiff’s action to enforce its prior rights to draw water
over the entire year, arguing that the action was barred by
laches and res judicata. The court held that the doctrine of
laches did not apply because the defendant failed to show
any prejudice from being able to use more water than the
defendant’s water right might allow under the plaintiff’s
allegations. The court also denied the summary judgment
for res judicata because the defendant failed to show that the
plaintiff’s predecessor in interest had been named as a party
to the 1920 suit, had signed the agreement or was served
notice of the proceedings. Devil Creek Ranch v. Cedar
Mesa Reservoir, 851 P.2d 348 (Idaho 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The plaintiff purchased several farm
implements from the defendant and granted a security
interest in the equipment to secure an installment note. The
defendant assigned the note to a bank and negotiated with
the plaintiff for payment of the note after the plaintiff’s
default. The plaintiff agreed to allow the defendant to sell
the equipment and to apply the proceeds against the note.
The equipment was sold, the proceeds were paid on the note
and the balance, after expenses of sale, was remitted to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for conversion because the
defendant failed to obtain the plaintiff’s consent to the sale
price of each piece. The jury found a conversion had
occurred but awarded no damages. The plaintiff argued on
appeal that the jury instruction was incorrect in that it
allowed the jury to offset the proceeds of the sale against the
conversion damages. The court held that where the
converter applied the proceeds against a specific debt of the
equipment owner, the converter’s liability for conversion
would be offset by the proceeds actually paid. Seibert v.
Noble, 499 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 1993).
The debtor operated a farm equipment dealership and a
used car dealership. The plaintiff had a priority security
interest in the farm equipment sold by the debtor and the
security agreement required the debtor to not commingle the
equipment sale proceeds with other business assets.
However, the plaintiff did not enforce this provision and the
debtor commingled all business proceeds in one checking
account. The debtor used the farm equipment proceeds to
pay on a loan from the defendant bank which knew about
the plaintiff’s security interest but did not know that the loan
payments were partially from the equipment sale proceeds.
The plaintiff sued the defendant for conversion and return of
the proceeds. The court held that because the debtor had
commingled the equipment proceeds with the other business
funds in the checking account and had made the loan
payments in the ordinary course of business, the bank took
the proceeds free of the plaintiff’s security interest where it
had no knowledge that the proceeds were from the
equipment sales. J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First Nat’l
Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a].* The Packers and Stockyards Administration
has certified the central filing system of Minnesota for a
wide range of farm crops and livestock. 58 Fed. Reg. 36389
(July 7, 1993).
LANDLORD’S LIEN-ALM § 13.01[5].* In 1989 and
1990, the plaintiff leased farm land to a tenant who had
granted a security interest to the defendant in crops planted
in 1989 and harvested in 1990. The tenant delivered the
crops to the defendant who used the proceeds to  paydown a
loan to the tenant. The plaintiff asserted a priority security
interest  based on a statutory landlord’s lien for unpaid rent
for 1989. The trial court entered judgment for the defendant,
holding that the statutory lien did not attach until the crops
were harvested in 1990, a lease year for which the plaintiff
had received the rent payment. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the lien attached when the crop sprouted, in
1989. The court also held that the Federal Farm Products
rule did not apply. Jenkins v. Missouri Farmers Ass’n,
Inc., 851 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE. The taxpayer farmed Arizona
land by “dry planting” barley. The defendant county
classified the property as vacant land for property tax
purposes and the taxpayer challenged the classification,
arguing that the land should be classified as agricultural,
thus receiving a valuation based on income and not full fair
market value. The court held that the evidence demonstrated
that taxpayer had no reasonable expectation of profit from
the “dry farming” of barley on the land where (1) no other
land in the area was used to dry farm barley, (2) the
taxpayer had only one of four years with a substantial profit,
and (3) a prudent landowner with no expectation of selling
the property for development would make use of irrigation
to avoid the hazards of planting barley in an arid climate.
Title USA v. Maricopa County, 851 P.2d 159 (Ariz. Tax.
1993).
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TRESPASS
TIMBER-ALM § 1.02[6].* The defendant cut timber
on property owned by the plaintiff without the plaintiff’s
permission. The plaintiff's property line was marked by two
three foot high stakes with red flags 173 feet apart. The
defendant testified that one of its workers should have seen
the stakes. The trial court awarded treble damages for the
loss of the trees. The appellate court affirmed the damage
award, holding that treble damages were warranted under
La. Stat. § 3:4278.1C, treble damages are awardable where
the trees are removed across a marked boundary. The
plaintiffs had purchased the forested property to preserve
the view from their residence. The court upheld an award of
$1,000 for mental anguish because the plaintiffs testified
that the loss of the trees greatly diminished the beauty of
the forest land. Baglio v. Gulf Coast Cas. Ins. Co., 617
So.2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Murphy v. U.S., 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1993) (futures
contracts), see p. 98 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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